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Ákos Major, the Presiding Judge of the first Hungarian People’s Tribunal recounts in his 
memoirs the emotional scenes of the very first trial in February 1945. It was a case of two 
guards at a forced labour batallion, who were accused of participating in the killing, torturing 
and looting of more than 100 Jewish persons. The relatives of the victims did not remain 
silent throughout the proceedings. Some were calling for retribution, others were weeping and 
begging to the defendants on their knees to reveal what happened to their loved ones. When 
witness testimonies graphicly described inhumane acts of torture and murder many spectators 
lost consciousness. Yet, the President did not attempt to maintain order in the courtroom. He 
readily admitted letting ‘free flow of passion, so grief, despair and hatred could freely mingle 
at the people’s court – that’s why we were a people’s tribunal.’2 
 Maybe Judge Major was right. When a war-torn Hungary was just about to come to 
terms with the shock of hundreds of thousands dying on the battlefield or as a result of mass 
aerial bombardments, other hundreds of thousands deported and exterminated in 
concentration camps and forced labour battalions with the active support or tacit approval of a 
significant part of the population and in the midst of a fundamental change of political system 
with the supervision of a hitherto feared and despised power, the Soviet Union, it would have 
been hypocritical to pretend a return to normalcy in abnormal times.  
 However, this is exactly what the establishment of the People’s Tribunals attempted to 
achieve. In Hungary, unlike in many other European countries where widespread lynchings 
and other forms of summary justice followed the end of Nazi rule3, the purge of those 
responsible for the war and the crimes committed against the population was to be 
administered by courts. Similarly to Bulgaria and Romania, the Soviet leadership regarded 
public war crimes trials in special courts as a powerful demonstration of justice as opposed 
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 the spirit of lawlessness of the previous regime and thus contributing to the consolidation of 
Soviet control.4 
 Application of war crimes law was not completely alien from Hungarian criminal law 
since the extant Military Criminal Code had already codified certain violations of the laws 
and customs of war.5 The newly emerging norms of crime of aggression and crimes against 
humanity were on the other hand completely unknown in the Hungarian legal system. 
Therefore this contribution aims to examine whether these new international offences found 
their way into Hungarian domestic law and whether the People’s Tribunals were directly or 
indirectly influenced by them.  
 
 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND LEGAL REGULATION OF THE PEOPLE’S TRIBUNALS 
 
The operation of the People’s Tribunals cannot be fully grasped divorced from their historical 
context. The defeat in the First World War led to cataclysmic changes in Hungary. In 1919 
the Hungarian People’s Republic was declared only to be shortly afterwards overtaken by the 
Hungarian Soviet Republic that attempted to violently introduces communism to Hungary. 
The widespread atrocities of the “red terror” of the communist regime were followed by the 
“white terror” of the new counterrevolutionary regime led by Governor István Horthy, who 
later granted a general amnesty to those who committed crimes out of „patriotric fervour”.6 
The regime’s ideology was based on fervent anti-communism and territorial revisionism since 
due to the Trianon Peace Treaty Hungary lost two-thirds of its territory and more than 3 
million ethnic Hungarians became minorities in neighbouring countries. Consequently, 
Governor Horthy strove to build strong ties with Germany and Italy since the 1930ies, and 
entered World War II as an ally of the Axis Powers in 1941, joining the military operation 
against the Soviet Union.7  
On 19 March 1944, following a botched attempt by Governor Horthy to withdraw 
from the Axis side, the German army occupied Hungary. The Hungarian Jewish population, 
which by that time became the largest Jewish population in Hungary, until then was subject to 
discriminatory racial laws based on the German legislation but not physically threatened. 
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 After the occupation, however, the small German contingent led by Adolf Eichmann that 
enjoyed the enthusiastic support of the Sztójay-government and thus the cooperation of the 
Hungarian public administration, in a matter of few months deported more than 400.000 
people to extermination camps. The last chapter of the Holocaust was predominantly written 
by the blood of Hungarian Jews.8 
On 2 December 1944 five Hungarian opposition parties formed a coalition in the town 
of Szeged and created the National Independence Front with the aim of shepherding the 
country to a democratic transition.9 Already at this time the creation of a special court system 
was envisaged. The programme of the National Independence Front pronounced that ’traitors 
and war criminals shall be arrested and transferred for prosecution to people’s tribunals 
created for this purpose’. 10  The coalition parties on 22 December 1944 established a 
Provisional National Government led by Miklós Béla Dálnoki that issued a declaration on the 
very day of its establishment emphasizing the need to prosecute or extradite those who 
committed war crimes or crimes against the people.11 This resolution became an international 
obligation by the signing of the Moscow Armistice Agreement on 20 January 1945. Article 14 
stipulated that ‘Hungary will cooperate in arresting the persons charged with having 
committed war crimes. It will either extradite them to the governments concerned or will pass 
judgment on them.’ 12  The agreement created an international legal obligation for the 
government of Hungary to create the material conditions for the prosecution of the 
perpetrators of international crimes.13 
 Henceforth the establishment of the system of people’s courts gained considerable 
momentum. On 25 January 1945 Prime Minister Miklós Béla Dálnoki issued Premier’s 
Decree [M.E.R.] Nr. 81/1945. “On People's Judiciary” with the stated goal that ’all those, who 
caused the historic catastrophe of the Hungarian people or participated in it should be 
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 punished as soon as possible.’ This decree and other subsequent laws14 created a system of 
people’s tribunals, defined their organizational structure, and scope of jurisdiction.  
People’s Tribunals were created as two-tiered extraordinary courts representing the 
desire of the Hungarian people to punish the perpetrators of crimes committed against the 
people. Its members were nominated by the five parties of the National Independence Front. 
The People's Courts made their decisions on the majority principle, thus appeals were possible 
only if the majority of the people's judges found the defendant worthy of mercy. If the appeal 
was turned down, the prisoner was executed within two hours. If the accused was sentenced to 
imprisonment of less than five years, neither the condemned person nor his/her council had 
the right of appeal – only the prosecutor. The National Council of People's Tribunals 
[Népbíróságok Országos Tanácsa - NOT] with a similarly partisan composition served as the 
court of appeals. 15  The importance attributed to the prosecution of war criminals and 
perpetrators of crimes against the Hungarian people is highlighted by the fact that such 
proceedings had started already before the official establishment of the People’s Tribunals.16 
After February 1945 within a short time-frame more than 50 people’s tribunal were 
established. 17  However, these exceptional courts were not simply tasked to prosecute 
perpetrators of horrendous crimes but also to demonstrate that the governmental policies of 
the past quarter century ineluctably led to disaster18  and thus help to eliminate potential 
opposition to the new order. 19 Justice Minister István Ries in the official commentary of 
M.E.R. Nr. 81/1945. emphasized that ‘The victorious Red Army has liberated Hungary. This 
has realized the first stage of the Allied Power’s programme to build a democratic people’s 
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 state in place of a feudal, fascist Hungary… Grave crimes were committed against the 
Hungarian people but a part of the people is also infected… Therefore the retribution of 
crimes and punishment of the guilty is an instrument of the cure as well..’20 Consequently, the 
judgments of the people’s tribunals – especially in the cases of major war criminals – strove 
to make a direct link between the Horthy-regime and Nazism. One ruling in this vein 
emphasized that  
 
It is a commonly known historical fact that following the fall of the Dictatorship of the 
Proletariat of 1919… which made a heroic, revolutionary attempt to liberate 
Hungary’s oppressed working classes and other social strata and to establish a 
Socialist economic and political system, our homeland fell into a dark age of 
counterrevolution and white terror, followed by the Horthy-type reactionary system of 
consolidation, that logically – that is, with unavoidable consistency and as if by law – 
led to the servile affiliation with Italian-Germanic policies, which eventually led to the 
evil and insane intervention in World War II, and finally, in 1944 poured the filthy, 
murderous flood of Arrow-Cross rule onto our people and our nation, a rule whose 
terrible acts and destruction of human lives and material goods were in proportion, 
scale, and methods beyond human comprehension… 21 
 
Accordingly, it is hardly surprising that from the very first moments of the establishment of 
the tribunals it was deemed paramount to prosecute members of the former elite. A list 
containing the names of 106 major war criminals was compiled22 that included almost every 
former prime minister and government officials. In the following years five former prime 
ministers and dozens of wartime cabinet members and generals were executed.23 
To further highlight the historical and political context of the cases, M.E.R. Nr. 
81/1945. introduced the institution of the political prosecutors. Political prosecutors were 
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 layperson without legal education who assisted the professional people’s prosecutors. The 
exact role of the people’s prosecutor was somewhat uncertain. He represented the ‘universal 
victim’, the Hungarian people, during the legal proceedings hence his status was equal to the 
victims. Nevertheless, he had the right to cross-examine the witnesses and the accused and 
make a closing speech though he could not raise or drop charges or appeal a verdict. 24 As the 
National Council of People’s Tribunals explained, his task was ’to uncover those historical, 
societal, strategic, legal, political, individual and psychological reasons that caused the death 
of hundreds of thousands of Hungarians, the misery of millions, destruction of our homeland 
and its shame. Finally, based on the morale of these historical trials, he has to show a way to 
the future…’25 
 Trial proceedings were not the sole instruments of purge of those allegedly responsible 
for the miseries of the Hungarian people. In line with the infamous declaration of the Potsdam 
Agreement 26  in Hungary, just as in Poland and Czechoslovakia, 27  ethnic Germans were 
deemed collectively responsible for the war and almost 200.000 were deported to Germany.28 
Moreover, about 40.000 people were interned by 1949 for suspected affiliation with the 
previous regime29 and and 103.000 people were placed on the so-called "B"-list that contained 
the names of unreliable state employees whose earlier conduct could result in their 
dismissal.30 
 Nevertheless, the trials of war criminals remained in the centre of public attention. 
Newspapers regularly reported on the proceedings of major war criminals and there was an 
often expressed hope that the victorious powers might display a more lenient attitude towards 
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 Hungary if justice is duly served. 31  Members of the Allied Control Commission and 
prominent politicians frequently attended the trials and sometimes even tried to intimidate the 
judges.32 Yet, even under such circumstances, recourse to the apparently neutral rules of 
international law could serve as a potent tool of legitimising the introduction and application 
of new substantive criminal law norms thus camouflaging the resort to political justice. In the 
subsequent parts I will attempt to analyze whether the newly emerging norms of international 
criminal justice – the crime of aggression and crimes against humanity - found their way to 
the jurisprudence of the People’s Tribunals. 
 
 
III. CRIMES AGAINST PEACE  
 
III. 1. THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF THE CRIMINALITY OF WAR  
 
Until the 20th century the right to wage war was a sovereign prerogative and the notion of war 
played a central role in the doctrine of international law. Classical international law was based 
on a strict distinction between the law of peace and the law of war, the realm of war 
pertaining only to armed hostilities between nations. However, the cornerstone of the legal 
framework of war was the application of formalistic criteria such as issuing a declaration of 
war33 or ultimatum expressing the requisite animus belligerendi34 and the conclusion of a 
peace treaty signalling the end of the state of war between the belligerent states. As a result, 
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 actual hostilities and the existence of a state of war could be separated.35 Nevertheless, apart 
from the beginning and termination of war in a technical sense, a state of war could also be 
acknowledged with the commencement of actual hostilities between states troops acting under 
the authority of their respective state36 – termed as war in the material sense or de facto state 
of war,37 - unless all the belligerent states denied its existence.38 
After World War I, however, the victorious Allied Powers attempted to introduce the 
concept of criminality of waging war. The Commission to Study the Responsibility of the 
Authors of the War concluded that Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria had 
declared war "in pursuance of a policy of aggression, the concealment of which gives to the 
origin of this war the character a dark conspiracy against the peace of Europe.’ 39 
Subsequently, Article 227 of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles provided for the establishment of a 
special tribunal to try Kaiser Wilhelm for ‘a supreme offence against international morality 
and the sanctity of treaties’, a somewhat cryptic but still recognisable allusion to the crime of 
aggression. Nevertheless, this Article was never operationalised and the ex-Emperor was 
never extradited from the Netherlands where he took refuge. 
In the interwar period codification in the framework of the League of Nations 
attempted to outlaw aggressive war. Article 1 of the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 
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 1923 stipulated that ‘aggressive war is an international crime’ and that no party could be 
‘guilty of its commission’.40 Similarly, the Preamble of the Protocol for the Pacific Settlement 
of International Disputes of 1924 asserted that ‘a war of aggression constitutes… an 
international crime’41 The Assembly of the League of Nations also unanimously adopted a 
‘Declaration Concerning Aggressive Wars’ on 24 September 1927 that emphasized that ‘a 
war of aggression can never serve as a means of settling disputes and is, in consequence, an 
international crime.’ The use of criminal law terms such as ‘crime’ and ‘guilty’ could possibly 
suggest that these and other similar instruments42 envisaged individual criminal responsibility 
in case of aggressive war. However, given the general context of adoption of this documents 
and the absence of definition of the crime of aggression it can be concluded these labels were 
used to emphasize the gravity of aggressive war as opposed to its criminal law 
ramifications.43 The campaign to outlaw war reached a crucial milestone in 1928 when the General 
Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, commonly referred to 
as the Kellogg–Briand Pact, was adopted.44 The Pact that was ratified by the overwhelming 
majority of the international community and renounced war as an instrument of national 
policy but failed to establish any responsility – state or individual – in case of the breach of its 
provisions.45 
 Somewhat surprisingly, the international criminalization of aggressive war found its 
staunchest supporters in the Soviet jurisprudence. By the late 1930s, Andrei Vishinsky, who 
became the foremost Soviet jurist after the demise of Evgeny Pashukanis, came to the 
conclusion that criminal law could defend the interests of the Soviet state even from 
imperialist powers. In 1937 he declared that ‘criminal law must be put on guard over the 
cause of peace and must be mobilized against war and against those who incite war.’46 In the 
same year with Vishinsky’s support another Soviet lawyer, Aron Trainin a book-length 
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 treatment of the topic entitled Zashchita mira i ugolovnyi zakon (Defence of peace and 
criminal law), which advanced the proposition that individuals should be held liable for the 
initiation of aggressive war.47 However, these views did not have much influence on the 
Western legal debates until the end of the war, when another of Trainin’s books was 
translated into English and widely disseminated in diplomatic circles. 48  By that time, 
embryonic forms of the crimes against peace charge were already beginning to emerge in 
Western Europe in mid-1943.49  
 Despite its contested nature, with the adoption of the London Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal (IMT), it became clear that the United Nations regard 
aggressive war not simply an international crime that incurs individual criminal responsibility 
but the supreme international crime, ‘the crime which comprehends all lesser crimes.’50 
Article 6(a) of the London Charter defined ‘aggressive warfare’ under the heading of ‘crimes 
against peace’ as: ‘planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war 
in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common 
plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing’. 51  The fact that the 
commission of the other two crimes within the jurisdiction of the Nuremberg Tribunal, war 
crimes and crimes agains humanity, was tied to the context of war highlights the fundamental 
importance of the aggression charge for the drafters. 
 The Nuremberg Tribunal’s judgment sought to dispel any doubts concerning the 
retrospective nature of the crime of aggression by attempting to prove that it had customary 
law status by 1939. It cited the various documents in the interwar period addressing the issue 
and placed special emphasis on the Kellogg Pact. The IMT concluded that ’the solemn 
renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy necessarily involves the proposition 
that such a war is illegal in international law; and that those who plan and wage such a war, 
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 with its inevitable and terrible consequences, are committing a crime in so doing.’52 The 
Tokyo Military Tribunal unsurprisingly concurred with this reasoning.53 
 The London and the Tokyo Charter failed to define the concept of aggressive war and 
left it to the judges to fill with content. However, since the Third Reich clearly engaged in a 
policy of territorial expansion, the judges did not need to precisely draw the contours of this 
crime. Nevertheless, a close study of the factual findings of the respective judgments reveals 
that the term ‘war of aggression’ includes: 
’(i) war with the object of the occupation or conquest of the territory of another State or part 
thereof; 
(ii) war declared in support of a third party’s war of aggression; and 
(iii) war with the object of disabling another State’s capacity to provide assistance to (a) third 
State(s) victim of a war of aggression initiated by the aggressor.’54 
 The personal scope of application of crimes against peace was similarly uncertain. 
While it obviously included the political and military leadership of Germany it did not specify 
the level of involvement of an individual that gives rise to criminal responsibility. The 
Nuremberg Military Tribunal accepted that crimes against peace were committed with the 
assistance of individuals who were not formally part of the state55 and ’assumed that anyone 
who either participated in the Nazi conspiracy to commit aggression or knew about the 
conspiracy and intentionally furthered it was guilty of the crime.’56 Accordingly, Hjalmar 
Schacht, a prominent figure in the rearmament of Germany as President of the Reichsbank 
from 1933 to 1939, Minister of Economics from 1934 to 1937 and Plenipotentiary General for 
War Economy from 1935 to 1937, was acquitted of the charge of participating in a common 
plan to wage aggressive war since the Prosecution could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that he had knowledge about the plan.57 Heller convincingly argues that a perusal of the post-
World War II. jurisprudence of the subsequent Nuremberg military trials and the Tokyo 
Tribunal demonstrates that beyond mere knowledge of planned aggression the accuseds had 
to be in a position to shape and influence the policy of aggressive war and then act in 
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 furtherance of that policy.58 Thus, irrespective of formal rank or position, active participation 
in the planning or waging of an aggressive war with the possibility to influence the war effort 
amounted established criminal responsibility. 
 
III. 2. HUNGARIAN APPLICATION OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 
 
The notion of criminal proceedings in relation to participation in a war was not completely 
foreign to Hungarian legal tradition. After World War I., the revolutionary government 
promulgated on 2 March 1919 People’s Act XXIII. of 1919 on the ’preparation of legal 
proceedings concerning persons responsible for the war.’ Even though quite possibly this law 
was the first ever normative formulation of the criminality of the initiation of war,59 the 
takeover of Governor Horthy prevented any actual criminal trials. 
 The crime of aggression only returned with the adoption of Decree 81/1945. M.E. 
Article 11. of the Decree stipulated that war criminal is: 
 
(1) who contributed to the involvement of Hungary in the 1939 war in a leadership 
position or failed to prevent it even though he could have had the opportunity due to 
prominent position in public administration, or political, economic or intellectual 
position. 
(2) who, as a the member of the cabinet or the parliament, or as a prominent public 
official, initiated, or even though he could have foreseen the consequences, 
participated in adopting a resolution that led the Hungarian people to war. 
(3) who attempted to prevent the conclusion of the armistice agreement by violence or 
by using his influence… 
 
Even though the Decree precedes the London Charter by 8 months, its content is remarkably 
close to the London Charter’s definition of crimes against peace and in many respects 
presages the jurisprudence of post-World War II. criminal fora. It makes it clear that any 
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 conduct that contributed to Hungary’s participation in the war or a potential failure to prevent 
it could be deemed a criminal act. However, it might be argued that even though the notion of 
criminalizing participation in the war was based on the pressure of the victorious Allied 
Powers, its actual implementation took the form of a sui generis Hungarian domestic 
regulation that was independent from the emerging international criminal law regulation 
pertaining to aggressive war. Yet, an overview of the first major war crimes trial, the trial of 
prime minister László Bárdossy proves that the people’s tribunals were aware of the 
international legal developments and made efforts to apply the Hungarian legislation in the 
spirit of international law. 
 László Bárdossy was a distinguished diplomat in the 1930s and was appointed as 
foreign minister in February 1941 and shortly afterwards – after the suicide of prime minister 
Pál Teleki – on 3 April 1941 he became prime minister, a position that he held for only eleven 
month. Still, even in this short time-frame he oversaw the Hungarian military participation in 
the attack against Yugoslavia, in the military operation against the Soviet Union and the 
recognition of a state of war with the United States.60 During the trial the Prosecution sought 
to prove that the accused was aware of the illegality of aggressive war under international law 
and knowingly engaged in illegal actions while the accused chose a sophisticated defence that 
was mainly based on international legal arguments.  
 On the very first day of the trial the prosecution asked Bárdossy whether he knew that 
‘aggressive war is deemed as an international crime due to developments since the last world 
war.’ Bárdossy retorted that such a determination was conspicuously missing in numerous 
conflicts following the conclusion of the Kellogg Pact and the reservations attached to the 
treaty clearly proved that the States Parties reserved the right to wage war under their own 
terms. 61  Bárdossy claimed that all the Hungarian actions were in conformity with 
international law. Hungary had not attacked Yugoslavia in breach of the Hungarian-Yugoslav 
Treaty of Eternal Amity and Friendship since the German military action started on 6 April 
1941, Hungarian troops did not cross the border until 10 April 1941, when Croatia declared its 
independence. In the Hungarian view, the independence of Croatia resulted in the dissolution 
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 of the Yugoslav Kingdom and thus Hungary had the right to occupy and annex Voivodina, 
where a substantial Hungarian minority lived.62  
 As for the attack against the Soviet Union, Bárdossy stressed that Hungary has not 
joined the German forces on 22 June 1941 when Operation Barbarossa was launched but 
simply severed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Contrary to the charges, no 
declaration of war was issued against the Soviet Union but on 26 June 1941 three Soviet 
fighter planes fired machine guns at an express train on its way to Budapest between 
Tiszaborkút and Rahó and one hour later unidentified planes dropped twenty-nine bombs on 
Kassa (Košice).63 The next day Bárdossy announced in the lower house of the Parliament that 
‘due to the inexcusable attack of the Soviet Union, completely contrary to the Law of Nations. 
The royal Hungarian government states that consequent to the attack a state of war exists 
between Hungary and the Soviet Union.’64 Bárdossy was keen to point out the difference 
between declaration of war and recognition of an existing state of war that was the 
consequence of an unlawful armed attack.65 However, this distinction seems to have been lost 
for the Prosecution and the Tribunal. 
The 2 November 1945 judgment of the Budapest People’s Tribunal rejected the 
defence arguments. It stated that ‘In the case of war crimes the collective legal object is the 
peaceful coexistence of humankind, that is fundamentally shattered and destroyed by the 
horrible destruction of aggressive war. Aggressive war amounts to an international crime due 
to certain international treaties created since the First World War.’66 It expressly referred to 
the Kellogg Pact, the 1924. Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes and 
the 1927. League of Nation’s Assembly Declaration Concerning Aggressive Wars as 
evidences of the criminal nature of aggression. It concluded that  
’According to the position of international law already before the Second World War 
aggressive war amounted to an international crime. The aggressor nation is guilty in 
front of the community of nations. Therefore the accused, who was a diplomat with 
knowledge of international law, cannot claim that he, who directly caused the 
involvement of Hungary in an aggressive war as a prime minister and a foreign 
minister, is simply responsible but not guilty, as in countries guilty of the initiation of 
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 aggressive war the politician or politicians are also guilty that led their country to 
aggressive war without its will…’67  
 
While the judgment did not address the distinction between a declaration of war and 
recognition of state of war with the Soviet Union, it did reject the argument concerning the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia. The Tribunal pointed out that the Croatian government was just a 
German proxy and the Yugoslav army was still fighting at the time of the commencement of 
the Hungarian military operations. Consequently, the military operation was participation in 
an aggressive war.68  
 This judgment authoritatively affirmed that the Hungarian criminalization of 
involvement in World War II was a reflection of the international crime of aggressive war. It 
followed exactly the some logic as the later IMT judgment which is hardly surprising since it 
refers to the Report of Justice Robert H. Jackson that was available for the Hungarian 
authorities as well.69  This approach was shared by a considerable part of the Hungarian 
lawyers as well. On the day of the judgment the Criminal Law Committee of the Free 
Cooperative of Hungarian Jurists issued a resolution declaring that:  
 
The people’s tribunal is the delegated forum of international criminal jurisdiction. 
With reference to the agreements of the Crimean and Potsdam conferences and the 
Moscow Armistice Agreement, it can be concluded that even though the people’s 
tribunal is obviously a Hungarian court, in discharging its international obligations it 
acts as the delegated forum of interstate criminal jurisdiction… War crimes are crimes 
of international character, whose collective legal object is the order of the peaceful 
coexistence of humankind that is fundamentally shattered by aggressive war…70 
 
In similar veins, the Budapest People’s Tribunal in the judgment of Béla Imrédy, another 
former prime minister held that ’Perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against the people 
don’t simply attack and endanger their own country’s constitution and political system but the 
international legal order, the peace of culture and humanism...’71 Just like in Nuremberg, 
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 aggressive war war regarded as the root of all evil. The Tribunal in the case of former prime 
minister Döme Sztójay and his cabinet members accordingly found that  
The accuseds were part of the government established in 22 March 1944 that aimed at 
increased engagement of Hungary in the war. Every other act, the suppression of the 
left, the extermination of the Jews, making of public speeches that significantly 
influenced the public opinion, support to the Arrow-Cross movement, hindering the 
conclusion of an armistice agreement, support of crimes against the people were part 
of this common goal…72 
 
 Yet, even though the content of the crime of aggressive war could be identified to a 
high degree of certainty, the personal scope of application of the crime – not unlike in the 
international proceedings – remained vague. The reference to ’intellectual position’ in Article 
11(1) could have covered a large number of people not wielding real influence over the 
planning and waging of war. Indeed, in 1945 the president of the National Council of People's 
Tribunals, Isván Ries, stated that he would even ‘include those eminent publicists that 
supported these measures instead of criticizing them.’73 Fortunately, the crime of aggression 
was not applied in such a sweeping manner although certain contentious issues remained to be 
solved in the jurisprudence of the People’s Tribunals, especially with regard to the criminal 
responsibility of members of the Parliament.  
 In the first major trial of a legislator, Zoltán Meskó was found guilty of failure to 
prevent the Hungarian participation in the war. The National Council of People's Tribunals 
explained that ‘the role of the legislator obliges the representative to attempt to prevent every 
action that offends the Hungarian people’s interests, sentiments or moral. The accused failed 
to do so… and it is indifferent whether accused could have possibly prevented the increased 
engagement of Hungary in the war. He cannot rely on the fact that his fellow MPs also failed 
to do something or that he was hindered by the depressing atmosphere of government 
terror…’74 
 This decision implied that theoretically every single Member of the Parliament who 
did not vote against legislation that contribute to the war effort was guilty of aggressive war. 
However, it must be added that Zoltán Meskó was not an ordinary MP but an enthusiastic 
supporter of Nazism who – among others - founded of the National Socialist Agrarian and 
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 Labour Party in 1932.75 This might help to explain the arguably excessive approach of the 
Council. In a later judgment, the NOT came to a much more nuanced conclusion. In a 
judgment exonerating a former Member of Parliament for not voting against the 
determination of the state of war against the Soviet Union it emphasized that ‘in the given 
circumstances it would have been the patriotic and moral duty of every legislator to valiantly 
fight for the idea of liberty and humanity. However, such a heroic conduct in everyday life is 
only a moral duty and those who did not choose captivity instead of individual freedom or 
death instead of life cannot be found criminally liable…76 
 Thus, the People’s Tribunals, just like their international counterparts, focused on the 
question to what extent the accused was able to influence the war policy as opposed to his 
formal position. László Temesváry, the President of the Hungarian National Bank for instance 
was found guilty since in October 1944 he approved of the transfer of the National Bank’s 
gold and currency reserve to Germany which ‘contributed to the increased engagement of 
Hungary in the war.’77 
 
IV. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 
IV. 1. THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 
 
The first attempt to introduce a category of international crimes that could cover atrocities 
committed against the civilian population was in 1915, when a joint declaration was issued by 
the French, British, and Russian governments, condemning the massive and widespread 
deportation and extermination of hundreds of thousands of Armenians by the Ottoman 
government, stating: 
 
In view of these new crimes of Turkey against humanity and civilisation, the Allied 
governments announce publicly to the Sublime Porte that they will hold personally 
responsible [for] these crimes all members of the Ottoman Government and those of 
their agents who are implicated in such massacres.78 
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 The Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of War and on Enforcement of 
Penalties reported to the 1919 Preliminary Peace Conference that Germany and its Allies had 
committed numerous acts in violation of established laws and customs of war ‘and the 
elementary laws of humanity’, the latter reference being identified as offences committed by 
the Central Powers against their own nationals.79 However, the Versailles and the Lausanne 
Peace Treaties eventually did not include reference to criminal proceedings for crimes 
committed against a country’s own civilian population.80  
 The tragic event of World War II. resurrected the notion of accountability for such 
crimes. On 17 December 1942 the United Nations issued a declaration about the German 
intention to exterminate Jews and emphasized that those responsible will not escape 
retribution. The United Nations War Crimes Commission also at an early time suggested the 
extension of punishment beyond war crimes.81 The actual formulation of the crime, however, 
remined undetermined until the the adoption of the London Charter. 82 The modern usage of 
the words “crimes against humanity” dates from the Nuremberg Charter, article 6(c) of which 
reads as follows: 
 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before 
or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution 
of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or 
not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated. 
 
This new category of crimes against humanity was introduced to ensure that inhumane acts 
committed against the civilian population in connection with war are punished, hence, it 
served as an ’accompanying’ or ’accessory’ crime to either crimes against peace or war 
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 crimes.83 In effect, the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal treated the concept as an 
extension of war crimes.84  
There is general agreement that crimes against humanity require ‘widespread or 
systematic’ commission in which ‘the hallmark of ‘systematic’ is the high degree of 
organization, and that features such as patterns, continuous commission, use of resources, 
planning, and political objectives are important factors.’85 Widespread commission, on the 
other hand, is the quantitative aspect of crimes against humanity which typically denotes 
numerous inhumane acts 86  but might also be satisfied by a singular massive act of 
extraordinary magnitude.87 In the Alstötter case the US Military Tribunal thus pronounced 
that ‘crimes against humanity as defined in C.C. Law 10 must be strictly construed to exclude 
isolated cases of atrocities or persecutions whether committed by private individuals or by a 
governmental authority.88 The United Nations War Crimes Commission similarly concluded 
that  
 
Isolated offences did not fall within the notion of crimes against humanity. As a rule 
systematic mass action, particularly if it was authoritative, was necessary to transfer a 
common crime, punishable only under municipal law, into a crime against humanity, 
which thus became also the concern of international law. Only crimes which either by 
their magnitude and savagery or by their large number or by the fact that a similar 
pattern was applied at different times and places, endangered the international 
community or shocked the conscience of mankind, warranted intervention by states 
other than that on whose territory the crimes had been committed, or whose subjects 
had become their victims.89 
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The creation of the category of crimes against the people was based on the same rationale as 
the drafting of crimes against humanity – to criminalize certain acts committed against the 
civilian population. However, since as seen above the category of crimes against humanity 
was still just an emerging concept in 5 February 1945, the time of the adoption of Decree 
81/1945 M.E., the category of crimes against people applies to a much broader scope of 
conducts. Articles 15 establishes the criminal responsibility of  
(1)  public officials in ministries, Members of the Parliament or high ranking state 
officials that initiated a law seriously infringing the interests of the people, or 
knowingly participated in its adoption, 
(2) public officials that after 1 September 1939 engaged in activities going beyond the 
confines of the execution of laws and decrees aimed against certain groups of the 
people that threatened or infringed personal liberty or causes bodily harm or resulted 
in financial loss,  
(3) public officials with jurisdiction, whose activities were categorically hostile to the 
people and fascist-friendly, 
(4) anybody who in print, in public or through radio transmission for a longer period of 
time engaged in permanent and continuous activity that was capable of significantly 
influencing the public opinion and distort it in a manner harmful to the country in 
order to spread fascist or anti-democratic views or incite and maintain racial and 
religious hatred, 
(5) anybody who served as an informant for official organs, parties, or societies with 
fascist and anti-democratic proclivities or persecuting certain groups of the society, 
(6) anybody who using the fascist and anti-democratic regime’s powers for their own 
goals committed sexual assault or crime against personal freedom.  
 
Article 17 complemented these prohibited acts with the crime of voluntarily joining the ethnic 
German organization, the Volksbund, or holding a position or being an active member in a 
fascist or anti-democratic party, organization or movement and support or failure to prevent 
acts enumerated in Article 15.  
 One of the fundamental elements of crimes against the people was the violation of 
human dignity, the inhumane nature of the prohibited conduct. This is very similar to crimes 
 against humanity where ‘the natural law concept of ‘laws of humanity’ provided a convenient 
starting point for those seeking to justify punishing the perpetrators of large-scale human 
rights violations within state borders. It was a short step from ‘laws of humanity’ to ‘crimes 
against humanity’.90 Indeed, in the judgment of István Antal, who was minister of justice and 
secretary of state in numerous Hungarian governments, and in his position participated in the 
adoption of legal regulation seriously restricting the fundamental rights of Hungarian citizens, 
the National Council of People's Tribunals highlighted the moral core of crimes against the 
people. The Council claimed that ‘the legislature cannot pass a law that infringes our 
fundamental laws, the basic human rights’ and ‘the responsibility of the accused can be be 
determined based on both divine and human laws.’91 
Similarly, the Bárdossy judgment emphasized the inhuman nature of the deportation of 
about twenty-thousand Jewish persons in the summer of 1941 to Kamenets-Podolski where 
they were executed by German troops. The National Council stated that ‘The expulsion of 
innocent people to certain and horrible destruction was the first procedure that created a 
precedent for future procedures that resulted in the killing of hundreds of thousands of 
Hungarians in gas chambers and other torture chambers. The accused had the obligation to 
prevent this procedure that debased all European culture and human feelings...’92 
 Another corresponding element to crimes against humanity was the existence of a 
targeted group. Mistreatment of soldiers93 or youth squad members94 by their commanders did 
not amount to crimes against the people since the subordinates did not belong to a persecuted 
group.  
 Finally, just like crimes against humanity, crimes against the people also constituted 
an ancillary category to other crimes. Thus, the accuseds were charged for acts that 
fundamentally contravened the interests of the people without directly contributing to the war 
effort or infringing the laws of war.95 Still, in spite of the undeniable similarities between the 
two categories, it would be mistaken to regard crimes against the people as essentially the 
identical to crimes against humanity.96 
                                                     
90
 Margaret M. deGuzman, ’Crimes against Humanity’ in William A. Schabas, Nadia Bernaz (ed.) Routledge 
Handbook of International Criminal Law (Routledge, 2011) 122 
91
 NOT. I. 3678/1946/11. Judgment of 31 August 1946.  
92
 Pritz, Bárdossy László a Népbíróság Elõtt, op. cit.,. 369. 
93
 NOT. 764/1947.  
94
 NOT. VII. 7177/1946.  
95
 Lukács, op. cit., 258.  
96
 A view submitted in contemporary literature. See Szûcs János, ’Politikai bûntett’ [Political Crime] (1945) Ítél 
a Nép! Issue of 4 May 1945. 
  The commission of crimes against the people did not necessarily require as a result 
any actual harmful consequence against the targeted group. Miklós Serényi, a Member of 
Parliament for instance was convicted of crimes against the people for his speeches in the 
Parliament in which he proposed among other summary execution of Jewish people in case of 
aerial bombardments and further restriction of the medical work of Jewish doctors even 
though his rants never resulted in any actual legislation.97 The idiosyncratic feature of crimes 
against the people was a focus on the entirety of the Hungarian people as victim. The National 
Council of People's Tribunals underlined that ‘the victim is the Hungarian people itself, even 
if the aggression was directed against a certain group or certain individuals. Consequently the 
crime is committed even if it was not directed against an individual persecuted on ethnic, 
racial or political grounds… but against any Hungarian citizen.’98  
 This explains why any involvement in the activities of of ‘fascist or anti-democratic 
parties, organizations or movements’ was generally judged as a crime against the people even 
without any causal link between the accused’s conduct and any violent or discriminatory 
action. Mrs. József Trenkula, for instance, was indicted on charges that she had been involved 
in the distribution of clothes taken from Jews, and she had seen people shot dead on the 
streets, and ‘thus, by her activity, which was not of a leading character, she aided the Arrow-
Cross movement in gaining and remaining in power.’99 Membership in such groups was 
generally regarded as a crime against the people even if the accused’s activities were 
restricted to genuine law-enforcement. 100  Nevertheless, the jurisprudence of the National 
Council of People's Tribunals was far from settled on this point as in other cases non-active 
membership was a ground for acquittal.101 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION  
 
The creation and operation of the system of People’s Tribunals was obviously inspired by the 
Allied determination to punish people responsible for the war. Yet, in the absence of any 
access to preparatory materials which could have guided the codificators about the particular 
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 details of this newly emerging field of international law, the drafters of the Decree on the 
establishment of the People’s Tribunals were essentially left on their own. 102 
 The operation of the People’s Tribunals was affected by political expectations to 
quickly and harshly punish the perpetrators and show the Hungarian people the continuity 
between the Horthy regime and Nazism and uphold ’revolutionary legality’ without 
unnecessary ’legalistic entangledness’. 103  Justice Minister István Ries encapsulated this 
anticipation when he pronounced that ’Adjudication in these cases is primarily not a legal but 
a political question.’104 
 Yet, even though there was a clear demand for the Tribunals to become the 
instruments of ‘quick and thorough purge’ since ‘the defendants of these trials are not human 
criminals but beasts concerning whom the public cannot understand humanism’, 105  the 
revisionist approach106 that views the People’s Tribunals as simple political tools used to 
legitimize communist political takeover and to eliminate anybody who might obstruct the 
hegemonical aspirations of the communist party is hardly adequate. It is certainly true ’that a 
great number of minor Arrow-Cross members and minor Volksbundists fell victim to 
prejudiced investigations and showcase trials. A great many political detectives, people's 
prosecutors, and people's judges behaved like the Jacobins of old, who had regarded the 
country as divided in three parts: policemen, denouncers, and suspects.’107  
The judges of the People’s Tribunals generally endeavoured to observe due process 
standards. ‘Defendants had their say in court, and even though judicial irregularities were 
legion, no one was forced to plead guilty and none begged to be executed as had been 
customary during the Stalinist Great Terror and would again become customary in Eastern 
Europe in the late 1940s and early 1950s.’108 The purely ideological trials where defendants 
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 were charged with ‘conduct endangering the work of the democratic government’ based on 
Act VII of 1946 was less than 20 percent until 1949. 109 
 The jurisprudence of the People’s Tribunals was often contradictory and failed to 
establish a single standard and its judges were ‘divided by ideology stemming from the 
conflicts between the political parties’. 110  However, that is hardly surprising from an 
essentially transitional justice mechanism. As Petõ reminds as ‘it is difficult to imagine in that 
extraordinary, apocalyptic situation charged with all kinds of aspirations and emotions that 
any court could have worked “efficiently”’.111 Nonetheless, as I tried to illustrate in this 
article, the emerging norms of international criminal law did have an actual influence on the 
prosecution of perpetrators of international crimes. Maybe it is too much to say that the 
principles of the people’s adjudication were corresponding with the Nuremberg principles as 
suggested in contemporary literature112 but it is undeniable that not only scholarly articles113 
but actual judgments reflected on international legal questions employing legal argumentation 
that often closely followed the jurisprudence of the international military tribunals.  
This is particularly important since the prevalence of the belief that the People’s 
Tribunals operated merely as political tools could fundamentally change our perceptions 
about war criminality as well. As Tallgren reminds us ’A deficient trial may by its trauma 
engender taboos and martyrs. It may endanger open analysis of acts and responsibilities, 
thereby cementing a period in history under its protective cover. In a bedtime story turning 
into a nightmare, a trial becomes a damaged nuclear reactor that maintains its toxicity for 
interminable periods, slowly leaking emissions into its environment.’114 This article aimed to 
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 show that despite the many flaws of the People’s Tribunals their jurisprudence concerning the 
prosecution of war criminals was hardly deficient. 
 
 
